Threat Analyses for Voting System Categories

A Workshop on Rating Voting Methods

VSRW 06

8-9 June 2006

The George Washington University

Partially Funded by NSF


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Contact: vote@gwu.edu


NIST Threat Analysis Workshop


Invited speaker:

Alan T. Sherman
Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, and
National Center for the Study of Elections,
 of the Maryland Institute for Policy Analysis and Research
University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)


Topic: A study of vote verification technologies

Biographical sketch:

Short:
Alan T. Sherman is associate professor of computer science at UMBC and
director of the UMBC Center for Information Security and Assurance
(CISA).

URL: http://www.csee.umbc.edu/~sherman

Talk Abstract:

 We describe our findings and experiences from our technical  review of vote verification systems for the Maryland State Board of  Elections (SBE).  The review included the following four systems for  possible use together with Maryland's existing Diebold AccuVote-TS  (touch screen) voting system:  VoteHere Sentinel; SCYTL Pnyx.DRE;  MIT-Selker audio system; Diebold voter verified paper audit trail.  As a baseline, we also examined the SBE’s procedures for “parallel  testing” of its Diebold system.  For each system, we examined how it  enables voters who use touch screens to verify that their votes are  cast as intended, recorded as cast, and reported as recorded.  We also examined how well it permits post-election auditing. To this end, we  considered implementation, impact on current state voting processes and procedures, impact on voting, functional completeness, security against fraud, attack and failure, reliability, accessibility, and voter privacy.

Our principal findings are, first, that each system we  examined may at some point provide a degree of vote verification beyond what is available through the Diebold System as currently implemented, provided the system were fully developed, fully integrated with the Diebold system, and effectively implemented.  Second, none of the systems is yet a fully developed, commercially ready product.  This interdisciplinary study—the first of its kind—is of interest for the way in which it evaluates the systems, for the technical questions it raises about standard interfaces, and as a snapshot of the state of vote verification technologies and their commercial development.